Professor Stuart West

Experiments have shown that when one plant is attacked by a pathogen or herbivore, this can lead to other plants connected to the same mycorrhizal network up-regulating their defense mechanisms. It has been hypothesized that this represents signaling, with attacked plants producing a signal to warn other plants of impending harm. We examined the evolutionary plausibility of this and other hypotheses theoretically. We found that the evolution of plant signaling about an attack requires restrictive conditions, and so will rarely be evolutionarily stable. The problem is that signaling about an attack provides a benefit to competing neighbors, even if they are kin, and so reduces the relative fitness of signaling plants. Indeed, selection is often more likely to push plant behavior in the opposite direction—with plants signaling dishonestly about an attack that has not occurred, or suppressing a cue that they have been attacked. Instead, we show that there are two viable alternatives that could explain the empirical data: 1) the process of being attacked leads to a cue (information about the attack) which is too costly for the attacked plant to fully suppress; 2) mycorrhizal fungi monitor their host plants, detect when they are attacked, and then the fungi signal this information to warn other plants in their network. Our results suggest the empirical work that would be required to distinguish between these possibilities.

This chapter studies strategic behavior when agents have no information about the structure of the underlying game and they cannot observe other agents' actions or payoffs. Even when players have no such information, there are simple payoff-based learning rules that lead to Nash equilibrium in many types of games, as shown in Chapter 8. A key feature of these trial-and-error rules is that subjects search differently depending on whether their payoffs increase, stay constant, or decrease. This chapter analyzes learning behavior in a laboratory setting and finds strong empirical confirmation for these asymmetric search behaviors in the context of voluntary contribution games. By varying the amount of information, we show that these behaviors are also present even when subjects have full information about the game.

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>The size–complexity hypothesis is a leading explanation for the evolution of complex life on earth. It predicts that in lineages that have undergone a major transition in organismality, larger numbers of lower-level subunits select for increased division of labour. Current data from multicellular organisms and social insects support a positive correlation between the number of cells and number of cell types and between colony size and the number of castes. However, the implication of these results is unclear, because colony size and number of cells are correlated with other variables which may also influence selection for division of labour, and causality could be in either direction. Here, to resolve this problem, we tested multiple causal hypotheses using data from 794 ant species. We found that larger colony sizes favoured the evolution of increased division of labour, resulting in more worker castes and greater variation in worker size. By contrast, our results did not provide consistent support for alternative hypotheses regarding either queen mating frequency or number of queens per colony explaining variation in division of labour. Overall, our results provide strong support for the size–complexity hypothesis.</jats:p>